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Abstract 
The introduction of monetary variables into post-Keynesian models of distribution and 
growth is an ongoing process. Lavoie (1995) has proposed a Kaleckian ‘Minsky-Steindl-
model’ of distribution and growth, incorporating the effects debt and debt services have on 
short and long run capital accumulation. This attempt, however, can be extended because 
neither has the rate of capacity utilisation been endogenously determined, nor have the 
potential effects of interest rate variations on distribution between wages and gross profits 
explicitly been incorporated in the model. In the present paper we therefore augment Lavoie’s 
‘Minsky-Steindl-model’, building our analysis on a Kaleckian distribution and growth model 
which has already taken into account distribution effects of interest rate variations on the short 
run equilibrium. Into this model the effects of debt and debt services are explicitly introduced, 
the effects of interest rate variations on the short and the long run equilibrium are derived, and 
the results are compared to those of Lavoie’s ‘Minsky-Steindl-model’. It is shown, that the 
effects of interest variations on the endogenously determined equilibrium values of the model 
do not only depend on the parameter values in the savings and investment functions but also 
on initial conditions with respect to the interest rate and the debt-capital-ratio. 
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1. Introduction 
Until recently, the impacts of monetary variables have rarely been considered to be relevant 
for the equilibrium solution in post-Keynesian models of distribution and growth in the 
tradition of Kaldor (1956, 1957, 1961) and Robinson (1962), on the one hand, and Kalecki 
(1954) as well as Steindl (1952), on the other hand.1 In the 1980s/90s, however, post-
Keynesians have started to take Keynes’s (1933) research programme of a ‘monetary theory 
of production’ seriously and have introduced monetary variables into the Kaldorian and 
Kaleckian variants of the post-Keynesian growth and distribution models.2 These models 
usually rely upon the post-Keynesian ‘horizontalist’ approach to monetary theory: The rate of 
interest is considered to be an exogenous variable for production and accumulation mainly 
under the control of the central bank whereas the quantities of credit and money are 
endogenous to production and accumulation.3 Integrating this approach into post-Keynesian 
models of distribution and growth has meant to integrate the rate of interest explicitly into the 
investment function, in the first place. Lavoie (1995) has shown the results for the basic 
Kaldorian/Robinsonian and Kaleckian models: Rising interest rates will be associated with 
lower rates of capital accumulation in both types of models. In the Kaleckian models with a 
long run variable rate of capacity utilisation, the equilibrium rate of utilisation will fall when 
interest rates rise, whereas income distribution determined by mark-up pricing will remain 
constant. In the Kaldorian/Robinsonian model, however, with a long run normal rate of 
capacity utilisation and distribution determined by capital accumulation, rising interest rates 
will be associated with a falling profit share and a decreasing ‘normal’ rate of profit.4 
 
                                                 
1 See Amadeo (1986, 1986a, 1987), Bhaduri/Marglin (1990), Dutt (1984, 1987), Kurz (1994, 1995) and 
Rowthorn (1981) for modern Kaleckian models, and Lavoie (1992, pp. 282-347) as well as Hein (2004, pp. 149-
219) for surveys of Kaldorian/Robinsonian and Kaleckian models of distribution and growth. 
2 See, among others, in particular Lavoie (1992, pp. 347-371, 1993, 1995), Lavoie/Rodriguez/Seccareccia 
(2004), Dutt/Amadeo (1993), Dutt (1989, 1992), Taylor (1985) and Hein (1999, 2004, pp. 221-238). 
Hein/Ochsen (2003) have used a Kaleckian type model in order to assess the empirical development of interest 
rates, income shares and capital accumulation in some advanced OECD countries. The introduction of monetary 
variables into the models based on Robinson and Kalecki has solid foundation in the work of these authors. See 
Lavoie (1999), Rochon (1999, pp. 143-150, 2001), Vernengo/Rochon (2001) on Joan Robinson, and Arestis 
(1996), Dymski (1996) and Sawyer (1985, pp. 88-107, 2001, 2001a) on Michal Kalecki. And, of course, Kaldor 
(1970, 1982, 1985) has been the founding father of the post-Keynesian ‘horizontalist’ theory of money (see also 
Rochon (1999, pp. 99-117, 2000) and Vernengo/Rochon (2001)). 
3 See Kaldor (1970, 1982, 1985), Lavoie (1984, 1992, pp. 149-216, 1996), Moore (1988, 1989) and Rochon 
(1999) for the post-Keynesian ‘horizontalist’ approach to monetary theory. 
4 Lavoie (1995) shows that this result is not only true for the Kaldor/Robinson variant of the post-Keynesian 
distribution and growth model based on flexible prices with respect to demand but also for Eichner’s model 
based on mark-up pricing in oligopolistic goods market in which the mark-up is determined by the required 
internal means of finance for planned investment. 
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The introduction of monetary variables into post-Keynesian models of distribution and 
growth, however, cannot be confined to only having directly adverse effects on capital 
accumulation. Changing interest rates also mean a redistribution of income between rentiers 
and firms with related effects on aggregate savings and consumption demand. And lasting 
variations in interest rates may also affect functional income distribution and hence the share 
of wages and gross profits in total income, as has been proposed by neo-Ricardian authors and 
can as well be found in Joan Robinson’s work (Lavoie (1995)).5 Integrating these effects into 
post-Keynesian models of distribution and growth makes the effects of changing interest rates 
dependent on the parameter values in the investment and the savings functions and on the 
elasticity of distribution with respect to interest rate variations. For a Kaleckian model, 
different regimes of accumulation can be derived, ranging from the usually expected adverse 
effects of interest rate variations on capital accumulation, capacity utilisation and the profit 
rate to positive effects throughout on the equilibrium values of the system (Lavoie (1993, 
1995), Hein (1999), Hein/Ochsen (2003)). 
 
However, also these models should only be considered a further step towards a better 
understanding of the short and long run effects of monetary variables on distribution and 
growth, because the effects of debt and debt services which have been highlighted by Kalecki 
(1937, 1954), Steindl (1952) and Minsky (1975) have not yet been fully incorporated. Lavoie 
(1995) proposes an attempt to introduce these aspects into a Kaleckian ‘Minsky-Steindl-
model’ of distribution and growth. His attempt, however, can be extended because he does not 
endogenously determine the rate of capacity utilisation and simply assumes it to be constant. 
Lavoie’s model also does not consider a potential effect of interest rate variations on the 
distribution of income between wages and gross profits in the savings and investment 
function. Therefore, in what follows we will augment Lavoie’s ‘Minsky-Steindl-model’ and 
address some of these effects. In order to do this we will base our analysis on the model 
briefly outlined by Lavoie (1993) and further elaborated in Hein (1999) and explicitly 
consider the effects of debt and interest payments in this model, in the short as well as in the 
long run. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we will describe the 
basic assumptions and the main characteristics of our model. Section 3 derives the short run 
equilibrium and Section 4 the equilibrium in the long run. In Section 5 we discuss the effects 
                                                 
5 See Ciccarone (1998), Panico (1985) and Pivetti (1985, 1987, 1991, 2001), among others. 
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variations in the interest rate have on the short and long run behaviour of a simple variant of 
our model. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The basic model 
In our model we assume a closed economy without economic activity of the state. Technical 
change is not explicitly considered. Under given conditions of production, there is just one 
type of commodity produced that can be used for consumption and investment purposes. It is 
assumed that there is a constant relation between the employed volume of labour (L) and real 
output (Y), i.e. there is no overhead-labour. The productivity of labour is therefore constant 
up to full capacity output and we get a constant labour-output-ratio (l). The capital-potential 
output-ratio (v) which describes the relation between the real capital stock (K) and potential 
real output (Yv) is also supposed to be constant. The capital stock is assumed not to 
depreciate. The rate of capacity utilisation (u) is given by the relation between actual real 
output and potential real output. 
 
Functional income distribution is determined by active price setting of firms in incompletely 
competitive goods markets. Writing w for the nominal wage rate, we assume that firms set 
prices (p) according to a mark-up (m) on constant unit labour costs up to full capacity output. 
Following Kalecki (1954, pp. 11-27), we assume that the mark-up in the price equation is 
mainly determined by the degree of price competition in the goods markets and by the relative 
powers of capital and labour in the labour market: 
 
( ) .0m,wlm1p >+=       (1) 
 
From this we get for the profit share (h), i.e. the proportion of profits (Π) in nominal output 
(pY): 
 
m1
11
pY
h +−=
Π= .         (2) 
 
The profit rate r relates the annual flow of profits to the nominal capital stock. The rate of 
profit depends on the endogenously determined profit share, the rate of capacity utilisation 
and the capital-potential output-ratio: 
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v
1hu
K
Y
Y
Y
YpK
r
v
v =Π=Π= .        (3) 
 
Introducing monetary variables into the model, we follow the post-Keynesian ‘horizontalist’ 
monetary view developed by Kaldor (1970, 1980, 1982), Lavoie (1984, 1992, pp. 149-216, 
1996) and Moore (1988, 1989) and assume that the monetary interest rate is an exogenous 
variable for the accumulation process whereas the quantities of credit and money are 
determined endogenously by economic activity. In this view, the central bank controls the 
base rate of interest. Commercial banks set the market rate of interest by marking up the base 
rate and then supply the credit demand of consumers and investors they consider creditworthy 
at this interest rate. The central bank accommodates the necessary amount of cash. For the 
sake of simplicity, in what follows we suppose that the central bank’s interest rate policy 
controls the real long-term interest rate, i.e. the long-term nominal interest rate corrected by 
the inflation rate. The pace of capital accumulation therefore has no direct feedback on the 
interest rate. The position taken here in so far differs from those post-Keynesian views which 
assume that a decreasing liquidity position of commercial banks and rising lender’s and 
borrower’s risk finally lead to rising interest rates when the volume of credit is expanding in 
the accumulation process (Minsky (1986), Palley (1996), Rousseas (1998), Wray (1990)). In 
our post-Keynesian distribution and growth model based on the principle of effective demand, 
we rather follow Pasinetti’s recommendation for the treatment of the rate of interest in the 
theory of effective demand: 
 
„However important a role liquidity preference may play in Keynes’ monetary 
theory, it is entirely immaterial to his theory of effective demand. What this 
theory requires, as far as the rate of interest is concerned, is not that the rate of 
interest is determined by liquidity preference, but that it is determined 
exogenously with respect to the income generation process. Whether, in particular, 
liquidity preference, or anything else determines it, is entirely immaterial.” 
(Pasinetti (1974, p. 47)) 
 
The pace of accumulation is determined by the entrepreneurs’ decisions to invest. But 
investment as the causal force of accumulation has to be financed independently of savings, 
because investment precedes income and hence savings. Therefore, firms need access to 
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credit. Short-term credit is needed for ‘finance’ or ‘initial finance’ of additional production.6 
The banking sector is capable of supplying any creditworthy demand for credit at a given 
interest rate determined by the policies of the central bank. The supply of short-term credit is 
therefore not limited by the supply of savings. When production has been initiated and 
income has been generated, the proportion of income not consumed, i.e. savings, stands ready 
to supply the ‘final finance’ or ‘funding’ of investment goods newly produced. In general, this 
may take place through retained earnings, the issuing of bonds and shares or through long-
term credit. Here we shall assume that funding is supplied only by retained earnings or by 
long-term credit of rentiers‘ households. By means of this simplification we do not have to 
distinguish between creditor households receiving interest income, on the one hand, and 
shareholder households receiving dividend income, on the other hand, and their different 
savings propensities, as in Lavoie (1995).7 
 
We further assume that the monetary circuit will be closed in each period. This means there is 
no varying demand for liquidity by private households which could disturb the transformation 
of short-term credit into long-term credit or the conversion of ‘initial finance’ into ‘final 
finance’. Under these conditions, we may also assume a single interest rate determined by the 
policy of the central bank. 
 
Introducing interest payments to rentiers‘ households into the model, profit splits into profit of 
enterprise Πn and rentiers‘ income Z.8 Rentiers‘ income is determined by the stock of long-
term credit B granted to firms and the exogenously given rate of interest i. 
 
iBZ nn +Π=+Π=Π .        (4) 
 
The debt-capital-ratio is denoted by λ. This ratio is assumed to be given in the short run but it 
will vary in the long run: 
 
                                                 
6 The distinction between short term finance for production purposes and long-term finance for investment 
purposes can be found in the monetary circuit approach (see, in particular, Graziani (1989, 1994), Lavoie (1992, 
pp. 151-169), Seccareccia (1996, 2003)). 
7 Of course, our simplification implies that the propensity to save of capital owners and shareholders is unity. 
8 In what follows the terms ‘profit’, ‘profit share’ and ‘profit rate’ are related to gross profits as the sum of profit 
of enterprise and interest. 
 6
pK
B=λ .          (5) 
 
The mark-up and the profit share also consist of two parts when interest is introduced, a part 
that covers profits of enterprise and a part for interest payments. According to Kalecki (1954, 
p. 18), the degree of monopoly, and hence the mark-up, may but need not increase when 
overhead costs, including interest costs, increase. Therefore, the profit share may but need not 
respond to a variation in the interest rate: 
 
0
i
h),i(hh ≥∂
∂= .       (6) 
 
Considering the distribution effects of interest rate variations we will consider two cases: 1. 
the case of an interest-inelastic or rigid mark-up and 2. the case of an interest-elastic or 
flexible mark-up. If an interest-inelastic mark-up prevails the real wage will not be affected by 
interest rate variations. Changing interest rates do not affect the distribution of income 
between wages and profits but only cause a redistribution between profits of enterprise and 
rentiers‘ income. This view can be found in Marx’s theory of interest that considers interest 
payments a part of surplus value produced by productive labourers (Marx (1967, pp. 338)).9 If 
an interest-elastic mark-up dominates, changing interest rates will directly affect the real 
wage. Rising (falling) interest rates cause rising (falling) mark-ups, rising (falling) prices, and 
falling (rising) real wages at constant nominal wages. Under these conditions, changing 
interest rates affect the distribution of income between profits and wages, whereas the profits 
of enterprise remain constant. This position that considers interest a part of firms’ costs of 
production can be found in neo-Ricardian work (Panico (1985), Pivetti (1985, 1988, 1991)). 
There it is assumed that the exogenously given interest rate determines the rate of profit and 
closes the degree of freedom of the production price model by Sraffa (1960).10 
 
As the successful shifting of variations in interest rates to prices means a change in the mark-
up, the ability to enforce a permanent and stable redistribution of income at the expense of 
labour income by shifting interest rate changes to prices depends on those factors that 
                                                 
9 See also Pivetti (1987) and Hein (2004a, 2006). 
10 ”The rate of profits, as a ratio, has a significance which is independent of any prices, and can well be ‘given’ 
before the prices are fixed. It is accordingly susceptible of being determined from outside the system of 
production, in particular by the level of the money rates of interest.” (Sraffa (1960, p. 33)) 
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determine the mark-up, i.e. the intensity of price competition in the goods market and the 
relative strength of labour unions in the labour market. We may expect that a high intensity of 
competition and strong unions prevent rising interest rates from being shifted to higher prices 
permanently, but enforce falling interest rates to be transferred to falling prices. If the 
intensity of competition is rather low and unions are rather weak, rising interest rates will 
probably be accompanied by rising prices, whereas falling interest rates will not lead to falling 
prices. 
 
Introducing the interest rate into the savings and accumulation function of the model the 
following aspects have to be considered. First, interest payments by firms are an income for 
rentiers‘ households that will affect those households’ expenditures and thus consumption 
demand and the rate of capacity utilisation. Second, in the case of a flexible mark-up interest 
rate variations have an impact on real wages and hence on the wage-costs of production, but 
also on consumption demand out of wages. Third, interest payments are costs for firms and a 
drain of their internal means of finance which will directly affect their decisions to 
accumulate. 
 
In order to keep the argument simple, we will assume a classical savings hypothesis, i.e. 
labourers do not save. The part of profits retained is completely saved by definition. The part 
of profits distributed to rentiers‘ households, i.e. the interest payment, is used by those 
households according to their propensity to save (sz) for consumption and savings (Sz). 
Therefore, total savings (S) comprise retained profits and savings out of interest income. 
Taking equations (3), (4) and (5) into account, for the savings rate (σ) which relates total 
savings to the nominal capital stock we get: 
 
1s0),s1(i
v
uh
pK
SZ
pK
S
ZZ
Z ≤<−λ−=+−Π==σ .   (7) 
 
The higher the interest rate at a given rate of profit, a given debt-capital-ratio and a given 
propensity to save of rentiers‘ households the lower will be the savings rate, because income 
is transferred from firms that do not consume to rentiers who consume at least a part of their 
income. An increasing debt-capital-ratio reduces the savings rate for the same reason. 
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For the accumulation function, we rely on a monetary extension of the function proposed by 
Bhaduri/Marglin (1990). In their non-monetary model based on the principle of effective 
demand, the decisions to invest are assumed to depend on the rate of profit. Assuming the 
technical conditions of production to be constant, the profit rate is decomposed into the profit 
share reflecting the development of unit costs and the rate of capacity utilisation indicating the 
development of demand. Firms now have to at least partially finance their net investment 
spending by credit. Following Kalecki’s (1937) ‘principle of increasing risk’ we shall assume 
that the firms access to credit is positively correlated with the firms’ internal means of finance 
and negatively with their debt-capital-ratios: 
 
“The access of a firm to the capital market, or in other words the amount of 
rentier capital it may hope to obtain, is determined to a large extent by the amount 
of its entrepreneurial capital.” (Kalecki (1954, p. 91)) 
 
The higher the amount of the firms’ own capital, the higher the amount of debt capital that 
can be obtained for investment.11 Contrary to his earlier writing in Kalecki (1937), in Kalecki 
(1954, p. 91-92) the willingness of the firm to pay higher interest rates cannot compensate for 
a lack of internal funds or entrepreneurial capital. The firm’s willingness to pay higher interest 
rates rather reinforces the creditors’ scepticism with respect to the creditworthiness of the 
potential debtor. From these arguments it follows, that the rate of interest and the debt-capital-
ratio have a negative impact on investment. Therefore, a simple linear function for the 
accumulation rate g relating net investment I to the capital stock can be formulated as follows: 
 
0irfor0g,0,,,,ihu
K
I
K
Kg >−>>θτβαθλ−τ+β+α==∆= . (8) 
 
The parameter α stands for the motivation to accumulate which derives from the competition 
of firms independently of the development of distribution, effective demand, monetary or 
financial variables. The intensity of the influence of effective demand is indicated by β, 
whereas τ shows the weight of distribution struggle and θ the impact of debt and the interest 
rate. To induce investors to demand real capital goods instead of financial assets, the expected 
rate of profit has to exceed the rate of interest in financial markets. 
                                                 
11 A similar view was taken by Robinson (1962, p. 86) and Steindl (1952, pp. 107-138). Recent empirical work 
has shown that the interest rate has important effects on investment through its impacts on internal funds and 
hence on the access to external borrowing on imperfect capital markets (see Fazzari/Hubbard/Peterson (1988), 
Hubbard (1998), Schiantarelli (1996)). 
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In what follows we will derive the short and the long run equilibrium positions of the system. 
Following Lavoie (1995), we take the debt-capital-ratio as a constant in the short run which, 
however, becomes a variable to be endogenously determined in the long run. 
3. Short run equilibrium 
The short run equilibrium requires the adjustment of production and capacity utilisation to 
effective demand in the goods market. Therefore, the equilibrium condition is given by: 
 
σ=g .           (9) 
 
This equilibrium will be stable, if savings respond more elastically to variations in capacity 
utilisation then investment: 
 
.0
v
h
,0
u
g
u
>β−
>∂
∂−∂
σ∂
          (10) 
 
The equilibrium values (*) for capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and the rate of profit 
in the short run are as follows: 
 
( )
β−
τ+α+θ−−λ=
v
h
hs1i
*u Z ,        (11) 
( ) ( )
β−
τ+α+

 θ−−βλ
=
v
h
h
v
h
v
hs1i
*g
Z
,      (12) 
( )[ ]
β−
τ+α+θ−−λ
=
v
h
hs1i
v
h
*r
Z
.       (13) 
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With a constant debt-capital-ratio in the short run, we get the following reactions of the 
equilibrium values in the face of changing interest rates: 
 
( )
β−


 −τ∂
∂+θ−−λ
=∂
∂
v
h
v
u
i
hs1
i
u Z ,       (14) 
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g Z ,      (15) 
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∂+θ−−λ
=∂
∂
v
h
uh
v
1
i
hs1
v
h
i
r Z .      (16) 
 
If only stable short run equilibria are considered, the short run effects of interest rate 
variations depend on the interest rate elasticity of the mark-up (and hence the profit share), on 
the parameters in the savings and investment functions, i.e. the rentiers’ savings propensity 
and the elasticity of investment with respect to the debt and the interest rate, to the profit share 
and to capacity utilisation, and may also be affected by the debt-capital-ratio (Table 1). 
 
In the case of a rigid mark-up, the reaction of the equilibrium values to changes in the interest 
rate is mainly determined by the rentiers’ propensity to save and by the debt and the debt 
service elasticity of investment. If the rentiers’ savings propensity is rather high and the debt 
service elasticity of investment rather high as well, rising interest rates will cause falling rates 
of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation. This is the ‘normal’ case usually 
expected in post-Keynesian models. If investment, however, is hardly affected by debt and 
debt services and the propensity to save out of interest income is relatively low, there may 
arise regimes of accumulation with positive responses throughout the endogenously 
determined equilibrium values. This is what Lavoie (1995) calls the ‘puzzling’ case. With a 
rigid mark-up, the debt-capital-ratio does not affect the direction of change of the equilibrium 
values, but only affects the extent of change: The lower the debt-capital-ratio, the smaller will 
be the effects of interest rate variations. With a zero debt-capital-ratio and a rigid mark-up, a 
change in the interest rate will not affect the short run equilibrium position at all, as long as 
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the interest rate remains below the profit rate and the restriction in equation (8) is fulfilled. 
Theses results are similar to Lavoie’s (1995). 
 
In the case of an interest-elastic mark-up, not discussed by Lavoie (1995), however, the debt-
capital-ratio may affect the direction of change of the equilibrium position caused by an 
interest rate variation. In general, the lower the debt-capital-ratio is, the lower are the direct 
effects interest rate variations have on investment and on rentiers’ consumption and the more 
important are the effects exerted by the redistribution of income between profits and wages on 
consumption and investment. With an increasing mark-up following rising interest rates there 
will be an indirect positive impact on capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and the profit 
rate running through distribution, if investment is very elastic with respect to the profit share 
and very inelastic with respect to capacity utilisation. This may then dampen and perhaps 
even overcompensate a direct negative impact rising interest rates have on investment, or 
reinforce a direct positive impact. Therefore, in the case of an interest-elastic mark-up, the 
debt-capital-ratio may be of utmost importance for the direction into which changes in 
monetary policy push the economy. 
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Table 1: Responses of the profit share, the rate of capacity utilisation, the rate of accumulation and the rate of profit 
to a variation in the interest rate: stable short-run equilibria 
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4. Long run equilibrium 
In the long run, the debt-capital-ratio becomes an endogenous variable which then also has 
feedback effects on the other variables of the system. In order to analyse this, we start with 
equation (5) and assume away inflation, i.e. the mark-up may change but not the price level. 
For the growth rates of the variables it follows: 
 
gBˆKˆBˆˆ −=−=λ .         (17) 
 
Given our assumptions above, the additional long-term credit granted in each period (∆B) is 
equal to rentiers’ savings in this period. This does not imply that rentiers’ savings is a 
precondition for credit and investment. On the contrary, rentiers’ savings - as well as firms’ 
retained earnings - are a result of investment initially financed by short term credit, as has 
been made clear in monetary circuit theory.12 
 
iBsSB ZZ ==∆ .         (18) 
 
For the growth rate of debt it follows: 
 
is
B
BBˆ Z=∆= .          (19) 
 
In long run equilibrium the endogenously determined debt-capital-ratio has to be constant, i.e. 
. Integrating this condition into equation (17) and making use of equations (12) and (19) 
we get for the long run equilibrium debt-capital-ratio: 
0ˆ =λ
 
( )
( ) 

 θ−−β
τ+α−

 β−
=λ
v
hs1i
h
v
h
v
his
*
Z
z
.       (20) 
 
                                                 
12 See again Graziani (1989, 1996), Lavoie (1992, pp. 151-169) and Seccareccia (1996, 2003). 
 14
This equilibrium will be stable, if 0
ˆ <λ∂
λ∂  (Lavoie (1995, p. 168)). Making use of equation 
(17) and applying equations (12) and (19) yields: 
 
( )
β−


 θ−−β−
=λ∂
λ∂
v
h
v
hs1iˆ Z
.        (21) 
 
From this it follows for the stability condition:13 
 
( ) .0
v
hs1:if,0
ˆ
Z >θ−−β<λ∂
λ∂        (22) 
 
The long run equilibrium tends to be stable, if the rentiers’ savings propensity is low and 
investment decisions are very elastic with respect to changes in capacity utilisation but very 
inelastic with respect to changes in debt services. As in Lavoie (1995), this is the same 
parameter constellation which favours a ‘puzzling’ positive effect of interest rate increases on 
capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and the profit rate in the short run. If the rentiers’ 
savings propensity is rather high and investment decisions are very inelastic with respect to 
demand but very elastic with respect to debt and debt services, the long run equilibrium tends 
to become unstable. Deviations from equilibrium will generate a long run debt-capital-ratio of 
either unity or zero. The conditions for long run instability are associated with short run 
‘normal’ negative effects of interest rate hikes on capacity utilisation, capital accumulation 
and the profit rate. 
 
The effects of interest rate variations on the equilibrium debt-capital-ratio can be derived from 
equation (20): 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) 

 θ−−β
τ−α−θλ+∂
∂+

 θ−−βλ−

 β−
=∂
λ∂
v
hs1i
h2si
v
1
i
h
v
hs1
v
hs
i
Z
ZZZ
.   (23) 
 
                                                 
13 Note, that the stability of the goods market equilibrium implies (h/v)-β > 0. 
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First we consider the case of an interest-inelastic mark-up. With the conditions for a stable 
long run equilibrium given, increasing interest rates will decrease the equilibrium debt-
capital-ratio if this ratio is very high in the initial equilibrium, more precisely when 
( )
v
hs1
v
hs
Z
Z
θ−−β


 β−
>λ  (Appendix A). However, if interest rates increase when the equilibrium 
debt-capital-ratio is still low, i.e. ( )
v
hs1
v
hs
Z
Z
θ−−β


 β−
<λ , this ratio will be rising. When 
( )
v
hs1
v
hs
Z
Z
θ−−β


 β−
=λ  in the initial equilibrium, variations in the interest rate will not affect the 
equilibrium debt-capital-ratio. These results are different from Lavoie’s (1995) who gets a 
uniquely positive relation between the interest rate and the debt-capital-ratio in the case of a 
stable long run equilibrium. If the parameter constellation in our model implies an unstable 
long run equilibrium, rising interest rates will always trigger falling equilibrium debt-capital-
ratios (Appendix B), as in Lavoie (1995). 
 
In the case of an interest-elastic mark-up - not discussed by Lavoie (1995) -, our results are 
slightly modified. When the conditions for a stable long run equilibrium are given, a positive 
relation between the interest rate and the debt-capital-ratio becomes more likely, if investment 
decisions are quite inelastic with respect to unit labour costs and if in the initial equilibrium 
the interest rate is already very high, so that ( ) 0h2si Z >τ−α−θλ+ . With a high elasticity of 
investment with respect to unit labour costs and a low interest rate in the initial equilibrium, 
i.e. , an interest-elastic mark-up will make a negative relation between 
the interest rate and the debt-capital-ratio more likely. If the long run equilibrium is unstable, 
a low unit labour cost elasticity of investment and a high interest rate in initial equilibrium 
will reinforce the negative relation between the interest rate and the debt-capital-ratio. If the 
unit labour cost elasticity of investment is very high and increasing interest rates start from a 
low level, the negative relation between interest rate and debt-capital-ratio may be dampened 
or even be reversed. 
( ) 0h2si Z <τ−α−θλ+
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In our model, the relation between the interest rate and the equilibrium debt-capital-ratio, 
therefore, does not only depend on the parameters of the savings and the investment function, 
as in Lavoie (1995), but also on initial conditions, i.e. on the debt-capital-ratio in the initial 
equilibrium in the case of a stable long run equilibrium and on the level from which interest 
rates start to change when the mark-up is interest-elastic. These path-dependence features are 
absent from Lavoie’s ‘Minsky-Steindl-model’. 
5. Model behaviour when interest rates change: a simple case 
From our analysis so far it has become clear that the short run and long run effects of interest 
rate policies in our model may depend on the rentiers’ propensity to save, the elasticity of 
investment with respect to debt and the interest rate, the responsiveness of investment to 
capacity utilisation and to unit labour costs, interest rate elasticity of the mark-up, and on 
initial values of the interest rate and the equilibrium debt-capital-ratio. This is summarised in 
equations (23)-(26) which display the long run effects of interest rate variations on the 
endogenous variables of the model: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) 

 θ−−β
τ−α−θλ+∂
∂+

 θ−−βλ−

 β−
=∂
λ∂
v
hs1i
h2si
v
1
i
h
v
hs1
v
hs
i
Z
ZZZ
,   (23) 
( )
β−


 −τ∂
∂+θ−−


∂
λ∂+λ
=∂
∂
v
h
v
u
i
hs1
i
i
i
u Z ,      (24) 
( ) ( )
β−
β−τ∂
∂+

 θ−−β


∂
λ∂+λ
=∂
∂
v
h
uh
v
1
i
h
v
hs1
i
i
i
g Z
,     (25) 
( ) ( )
β−
β−τ∂
∂+θ−−


∂
λ∂+λ
=∂
∂
v
h
uh
v
1
i
hs1
i
i
v
h
i
r Z .     (26) 
 
In what follows, we will trace the short and long run effects of changing interest rates through 
the model. Only stable goods market equilibria will be considered, but potential long run 
instability in the debt-capital-ratio is taken into account. For the sake of simplicity, our 
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analysis of the effects on real variables is confined to the accumulation rate, and only the case 
of an interest-inelastic mark-up is explicitly discussed. For the other variables and for the case 
of an interest-elastic mark-up the interested reader is referred to the modifications and 
complications discussed above when deriving the relations between the monetary and 
financial variables, on the one hand, and the real variables of the system, on the other hand. 
The chosen simplifications make our results directly comparable to those derived by Lavoie 
(1995). They have the additional advantage that the model behaviour following interest rate 
variations only depends on three parameters, the rentiers’ propensity to save (sz), the 
investment elasticities with respect to capacity utilisation (β) and with respect to debt and 
interest costs (θ), and on the initial equilibrium debt-capital-ratio (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Effects of interest rate variations with an interest-inelastic mark-up 
( )
v
hs1 Z θ−−β   
+ – 
1. Interest rate and 
equilibrium 
accumulation rate 
in the short run 
i
g
∂
∂
, λ constant, 
equation (15) 
+ – 
2. Interest rate and 
equilibrium debt-
capital-ratio 
i∂
λ∂ , 
equation (23) 
–, if λ > 
0, if λ = ( )
v
hs1
v
hs
Z
Z
θ−−β


 β−
 
+, if λ < 
– 
3. Debt-capital-
ratio and 
accumulation rate 
λ∂
∂g
, i constant, 
equation (12) 
and Appendix C 
+ – 
4. Interest rate and 
equilibrium 
accumulation rate 
in the long run 
i
g
∂
∂
, λ variable, 
equation (25) 
+ + 
5. Stability of long 
run equilibrium 
debt-capital-ratio λ∂
λ∂ ˆ , i constant, 
equation (21) 
– 
(stable) 
+ 
(unstable) 
 
If ( ) 0
v
hs1 Z >θ−−β , the long run equilibrium debt-capital-ratio will be stable. This requires 
that the rentiers’ propensity to save is rather low and that investment is very responsive to 
capacity utilisation but very inelastic with respect to interest payments and debt. These 
conditions imply, on the one hand, an equal distribution of financial wealth across the 
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economy. Assuming that the propensity to consume declines with rising income, a more equal 
distribution of financial wealth - and hence yields from financial wealth - will amount to a 
lower average propensity to save. On the other hand, a stable long run equilibrium implies 
stable conditions of finance for firms, so that in the face of variations in the interest rate or in 
the debt-capital-ratio creditors do not change their willingness to long term finance and 
debtors do not change their willingness to invest very much. If this is the case, the ‘principle 
of increasing risk’ will only have little effect on investment. Decisions to invest are rather 
determined by sales expectations of firms than by the risks associated with increasing debt 
finance. We may expect that these conditions rather prevail in a bank-based finance system 
than in a capital-market based system. Bank-based systems are characterised by long-term 
relations between firms and creditors which are more stable than the short-term relations 
dominating in capital-market based systems (Grabel (1997)). Conditions for a stable long run 
equilibrium can also be assumed to prevail in periods of rapid and stable capital accumulation 
with stable sales expectations rather than in periods of stagnation with uncertain sales and 
profit expectations. 
 
When the interest rate rises in a constellation with a long run stable debt-capital-ratio, in the 
short run, with a constant debt-capital-ratio, the rate of capital accumulation will increase. In 
the long run, the debt-capital-ratio will vary as well with the direction of variation depending 
on the initial debt-capital-ratio: Starting from a high ratio exceeding the benchmark derived 
above will lead to a falling equilibrium debt-capital-ratio, starting from a ratio below the 
benchmark will make the equilibrium debt-capital-ratio increase. The rate of accumulation in 
the long run stable constellation moves in the same direction as the debt-capital-ratio 
(Appendix C). However, taking the direct and indirect - via changing debt-capital-ratios- 
effects of changing interest rates into account, the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation 
will also rise in the long run (Appendix A).14 
 
If ( ) 0
v
hs1 Z <θ−−β , the long run equilibrium will be unstable. This constellation requires a 
high rentiers’ propensity to save, a low elasticity of investment with respect to capacity 
utilisation and an elastic responsiveness to changes in the interest rate or in the debt-capital-
ratio. These conditions will be given, if financial wealth and the yields from financial assets 
are unequally distributed across the economy and if fragile relations between the financial 
                                                 
14 This is a result that also follows in Lavoie’s (1995) paper but there it is not explicitly mentioned. 
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sector and non-financial business dominate. Variations in interest rates then have significant 
effects on the willingness to finance and the willingness to invest. The ‘principle of increasing 
risk’ has a dominant effect on investment whereas changes in capacity utilisation are of minor 
importance. We may expect these conditions to prevail in capital market based finance 
systems (Grabel (1997)). Prolonged periods of economic stagnation with uncertain sales and 
profit expectations should also be conducive to this constellation. 
 
If interest rates increase in a parameter constellation yielding a long run unstable debt-capital-
ratio, in the short run, with a constant debt-capital-ratio, capital accumulation will decrease. 
The long run variable debt-capital-ratio will also go down (Appendix B). A falling debt-
capital-ratio should then have a stimulating effect on the equilibrium accumulation rate 
countervailing the short-run effect (Appendix C). In the long run, the equilibrium rate of 
capital accumulation will rise, also in the unstable case (Appendix B). 
 
However, the interpretation of the effects of rising interest rates under the conditions of an 
unstable long run equilibrium has to take into account, that changing interest rates will trigger 
an unstable disequilibrium process so that the new equilibrium will not be reached. Starting 
from a long run equilibrium position, rising interest rates cause falling accumulation rates in 
the short run and a falling equilibrium debt-capital-ratio in the long run. Since the actual debt-
capital-ratio now exceeds the new long run equilibrium ratio, instability of this equilibrium 
means cumulative deviation of the actual from the equilibrium debt-capital-ratio. Therefore, 
the actual debt-capital-ratio will increase and finally approach unity. This unstable 
disequilibrium process is hence characterised by falling accumulation rates and rising debt-
capital-ratios, both triggered by an increasing interest rate. We get a macroeconomic ‘paradox 
of debt’:15 Because of increasing interest rates firms cut down investment in order to reduce 
debt-capital-ratios and interest payments. The macroeconomic effect of this individual 
behaviour, however, is such that the actual debt-capital-ratios and hence interest payments 
will increase, inducing firms to further cut down investment etc.. When interest rates fall, the 
cumulative disequilibrium process is in the opposite direction: Falling interest rates induce 
rising rates of capital accumulation and falling debt-capital-ratios. When the ‘paradox of debt’ 
prevails, Kalecki’s ’principle of increasing risk’, i.e. a co-movement of investment and 
                                                 
15 On the ‚paradox of debt’ see, in particular, Steindl (1952, pp. 113-122), Dutt (1995) and Lavoie (1995). 
 20
indebtedness finally setting a limit to accumulation, is irrelevant at the macroeconomic level, 
as was already noted by Kalecki (1937) himself.16 
6. Conclusions 
The introduction of monetary variables into post-Keynesian models of distribution and growth 
is an ongoing process. Recently, Lavoie (1995) has proposed a Kaleckian ‘Minsky-Steindl-
model’ of distribution and growth, incorporating the effects of debt and debt services on short 
and long run capital accumulation. This attempt should be extended because neither has the 
rate of capacity utilisation been endogenously determined, nor have the potential effects of 
interest rate variations on distribution between wages and gross profits explicitly been 
considered. In the present paper we have therefore augmented Lavoie’s ‘Minsky-Steindl-
model’. The analysis has been based on a model briefly outlined by Lavoie (1993) and further 
elaborated in Hein (1999). Into this model the effects of debt and debt payments have 
explicitly been introduced, in the short as well as in the long run, and have been compared to 
those in Lavoie’s ‘Minsky-Steindl-model’. 
 
In the short run, with the debt-capital-ratio taken as a given constant, the effects of interest 
variations on the stable equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and 
profit in our model depend on the interest rate elasticity of the mark-up, on the rentiers’ 
savings propensity and on the elasticities of investment with respect to debt or debt services, 
on the one hand, and with respect to capacity utilisation, on the other. Depending on the 
values of these parameters, the effects of interest rate variations on the real equilibrium may 
be either negative throughout (‘normal case’), mixed or even positive throughout (‘puzzling 
case’) with a low rentiers’ savings propensity, a low debt services elasticity of investment and 
a high responsiveness of investment with respect to capacity utilisation being conducive to a 
positive effect of rising interest rates on capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and the 
profit rate. In the case of an interest-inelastic mark-up, the degree of indebtedness does not 
affect the direction of influence interest rate variations have on the real equilibrium. In the 
case of an interest-elastic mark-up, however, the degree of indebtedness may have an impact 
on the direction into which interest rate policies push the economy. From this it follows, that, 
                                                 
16 This ‚paradox of debt’ also invalidates the macroeconomic relevance of Minsky’s (1975) ‘financial instability 
hypothesis’ relying on a co-movement of investment and debt finally leading to a breakdown in investment due 
to increasing financial fragility, and of those post-Keynesian views by Minsky (1986), Palley (1996), Rousseas, 
(1998) and Wray (1990) arguing for endogenously increasing interest rates because of increasing indebtedness 
when investment rises (for a critique see also Lavoie (1995, 1996)). 
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contrary to Lavoie (1995), the degree of indebtedness has already to be taken into account 
when analysing the short run effects of monetary policies. 
 
In the long run, the debt-capital-ratio is an endogenously determined variable. As in Lavoie 
(1995), long run stability is associated with the a parameter constellation which yields a short 
run positive (‘puzzling’) relation between the interest rate and the equilibrium rates of 
capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profit: a low rentiers’ savings propensity and a 
low sensitivity of investment with respect to debt or interest payments and a high elasticity 
with respect to demand or capacity utilisation. We have associated this parameter 
constellation with equal distribution of financial wealth, long term stable relations between 
the financial sector and non-financial business given in bank-based financial systems, and 
with periods of rapid capital accumulation with stable sales and profit expectations. The 
parameter constellation yielding a short run negative (‘normal’) relation between the interest 
rate and the equilibrium real variables, however, is associated with long run instability: a high 
rentiers’ savings propensity and a high sensitivity of investment with respect to debt or 
interest payments and a low elasticity with respect to demand or capacity utilisation. This 
parameter constellation is more likely with unequal distribution of financial wealth, unstable 
relations between the financial sector and non-financial business aimed at short term capital 
gains as in capital market based systems, and in periods of stagnation with uncertain sales and 
profit expectations. 
 
In our model, the relation between the interest rate and the equilibrium debt-capital-ratio does 
not only depend on the parameters of the savings and the investment function, as in Lavoie 
(1995), i.e. on the rentiers’ savings propensity, on the elasticities of investment with respect to 
capacity utilisation, unit labour costs and debt services, and on the interest elasticity of the 
mark-up. The effects of interest rate policies on the long run equilibrium debt-capital-ratio 
and on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profit may also 
depend on initial conditions, i.e. on the debt-capital-ratio in the initial equilibrium and on the 
level from which interest rates start to change. These path-dependence features are absent 
from Lavoie’s ‘Minsky-Steindl’-model. 
 
Illustrating the effects of interest rate variations in our model we have finally assumed the 
simple case of an interest-inelastic mark-up. For the short run ‘puzzling’/long run stable 
equilibrium it has been shown, that the effects of an increasing interest rate on the equilibrium 
 22
debt-capital-ratio depend on the initial value of this ratio, i.e. there is an increasing effect if 
the initial value is low and a decreasing effect if the initial value is high. The long run effect 
on equilibrium capital accumulation, however, is always positive. In the short run 
‘normal’/long run unstable equilibrium, rising interest rates cause falling equilibrium debt-
capital-ratios but rising long run equilibrium rates of capital accumulation. Due to long run 
instability, however, the new equilibrium cannot be reached. Already the simple variant of our 
model is hence characterised by an unstable disequilibrium process yielding the ‘paradox of 
debt’: Rising interest rates cause falling rates of capital accumulation and rising debt-equity-
ratios - a result similar to Lavoie’s (1995). 
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Appendix A: Effects of interest rate variations with an interest-inelastic mark-up: 
stable long run equilibrium 
Starting from equations 
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assuming a stable short run goods market equilibrium as well as a stable long run debt-capital-
ratio and an interest-inelastic mark-up, the signs of 
i∂
λ∂  and 
i
g
∂
∂  have to be determined. An 
interest-inelastic mark-up, i.e. 0
i
h =∂
∂ , reduces (23) and (25) to: 
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The assumptions with respect to stability imply 0
v
h >β−  and ( ) 0
v
hs1 Z >θ−−β . Given 
these assumptions, the sign of 
i∂
λ∂  from equation (23’) depends on the value of λ, because 
(23’) can be rearranged: 
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From this it follows: 
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Inserting (23’’) into (25’) yields: 
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i
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∂ .          (25’’) 
In the stable long run, rising rates of interest always have a positive effect on the equilibrium 
rate of capital accumulation. The same result follows from equations (17) and (19) and the 
assumption that  in long run equilibrium. Therefore, it also applies to the case of an 
interest-elastic mark-up. 
0ˆ =λ
 
Appendix B: Effects of interest rate variations with an interest-inelastic mark-up: 
unstable long run equilibrium 
Starting from equations 
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assuming a stable short run goods market equilibrium, but an unstable long run debt-capital-
ratio and an interest-inelastic mark-up, the signs of 
i∂
λ∂  and 
i
g
∂
∂  have to be determined. An 
interest-inelastic mark-up, i.e. 0
i
h =∂
∂ , reduces (23) and (25) to: 
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The assumptions with respect to stability imply 0
v
h >β−  and ( ) 0
v
hs1 Z <θ−−β . Taking 
these assumption into account and rearranging equation (23’) always yields: 
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Inserting (23’’) into (25’) gives: 
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Also in the unstable long run equilibrium, rising rates of interest always have a positive effect 
on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation. Again, the same result follows from equations 
(17) and (19) and the assumption that  in long run equilibrium. Therefore, here it also 
applies to the case of an interest-elastic mark-up. 
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Appendix C: Feedback effects of changing debt-capital-ratios on the equilibrium rates 
of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profit 
Starting from equations 
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feedback effects of changing long run debt-capital-ratios on the equilibrium rates of capacity 
utilisation, capital accumulation and profit have to be determined. We assume that changing 
debt-capital-ratios, for the reasons given in the text, will have no direct feedback effects on 
the interest rate or on the mark-up. Variations in indebtedness will hence only affect the 
distribution of profits between retained earnings and rentiers’ income. This will in turn affect 
rentiers’ consumption demand and firms’ investment. From equations (11) - (13) we get: 
( )
β−
θ−−=λ∂
∂
v
h
s1iu Z ,         (11’) 
( )
β−


 θ−−β
=λ∂
∂
v
h
v
hs1i
g Z
,        (12’) 
( )
β−
θ−−
=λ∂
∂
v
h
s1i
v
h
r Z .         (13’) 
If only stable equilibria are considered ( 0
v
h >β− ) and a positive rate of interest is assumed, 
we get the conditions displayed in Table C1: 
 
Table C1: Responses of the profit share, the rate of capacity utilisation, the rate of 
accumulation and the rate of profit to a variation in the debt-capital-ratio: 
stable equilibria 
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It comes with no surprise, that under the assumptions made changing debt-capital-ratios have 
the same effects as changing interest rates in the case of an interest-inelastic mark-up. Rising 
debt-capital-ratios are associated with increasing values for the real equilibrium variables, if a 
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low rentiers’ savings propensity and a low elasticity of investment with respect to debt 
services prevail. A high responsiveness of investment to capacity utilisation supports a 
positive relation between indebtedness and capital accumulation. However, if the rentiers’ 
savings propensity is rather high and associated with a high elasticity of investment with 
respect to debt services, rising indebtedness will rather have a negative effect on the real 
variables. A low responsiveness of investment to demand reinforces this negative impact on 
capital accumulation. 
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